Assessing the EU industrial accelerator act: Wood Mackenzie’s analysis of its shortcomings
The Industrial Accelerator Act will likely not allow the EU to reach its target of 20% industrial GDP by 2035, though it may slow the decline of manufacturing. This is the result of an analysis by the think tank Wood Mackenzie, which starts from a structural data point: Europe’s share of global manufacturing GDP fell from 17.4% in 2000 to 14.3% in 2024.
In this context, the plan introduces demand-side instruments, authorizations, and supply chains, but according to analysts, its effectiveness is diminished by operational choices that soften its impact.
The central issue concerns the shift from potentially binding measures to often circumventable mechanisms, especially when European industrial costs are higher.
The main criticalities emerge most clearly in the key transition supply chains: solar, wind, hydrogen, batteries, and critical raw materials.
Solar: 30 GW annual demand at risk due to technological delay
In photovoltaics, Wood Mackenzie highlights that European content requirements can support a demand of up to 30 GW annually by 2030. However, the main limitation is temporal. The three-year delay in implementation risks leaving the European industry out of sync with technological evolution.
This element is reflected in industrial data. Today, Europe is highly dependent on imports, with 94% of solar modules and cells coming from China. Internal production capacity is also incomplete along the supply chain: European production covers only 10% of cells and none for wafers and ingots.
In this context, the analysis that Europe risks chasing the market rather than leading it appears consistent with the current industrial structure.
Wind: Chinese pressure grows
For wind, Wood Mackenzie acknowledges that rules on European origin can support the existing supply chain, also introducing indirect barriers to non-EU producers.
Data confirm a still solid position for the European industry, with an 89% share of the internal market in 2023. However, global competitiveness is declining: Europe’s share fell from 30% to 23% in one year, while China’s rose to 55%.
A further element concerns costs. Chinese turbines are 10% to 45% cheaper. This reinforces the assessment that European measures can protect the internal market but do not resolve the global competitive gap.
Hydrogen: production capacity constrained by insufficient demand
In the hydrogen sector, Wood Mackenzie identifies an imbalance between industrial capacity and demand. The most significant data point concerns costs: a 100 MW Chinese electrolyzer costs approximately $30 million, compared to $115 million for an equivalent Western one.
This differential explains why waiver clauses, activated when European costs exceed alternative ones by approximately 20-30%, risk effectively emptying local production requirements.
On the industrial front, European capacity exists but is underutilized. Plants operate at less than 20% of nominal capacity, a sign of still weak demand. This confirms the analysis that the problem is not just productive but primarily market-related.
Batteries: growing capacity but unstable investments
For batteries, Wood Mackenzie signals the risk that measures could discourage investments, also due to limits on foreign ownership and delays in rule application.
Industrial data show significant potential growth: capacity could increase from 188 GWh in 2024 to 872 GWh by 2030. However, over 250 GWh of projects have already been canceled.
This trend highlights strong volatility in the sector, linked precisely to demand uncertainty and global competition. Chinese dominance remains evident, with 86% of global cell production and over 90% of key materials.
Critical raw materials: objectives limited by costs in the industrial accelerator act
On critical raw materials, Wood Mackenzie highlights how the 30% local sourcing target is effectively weakened by a key clause: the possibility of a waiver if costs increase by more than 25%.
This approach is consistent with European industrial logic, which aims to avoid excessive cost increases. However, it limits the ability to reduce external dependencies.
Supply chain data confirm this vulnerability, particularly in strategic materials where dependence on non-EU suppliers remains high and structural.
Energy costs: the unresolved structural limit of the industrial accelerator act
The most critical point identified by Wood Mackenzie concerns costs. The plan does not address the main factors of competitive disadvantage: energy, capital, and raw materials.
This element is confirmed by industrial data. European products are often not competitive compared to global alternatives, so much so that local preference mechanisms become optional when costs are higher.
The trajectory of carbon pricing also contributes to pressure on industrial sectors, with expected values around $160 per ton of CO₂ by 2034.
Industrial transition still fragile in the industrial accelerator act
The Industrial Accelerator Act, therefore, introduces relevant instruments and can help slow the European industrial decline.
However, data on strategic supply chains show structural limitations. In solar, technological delay and strong external dependence emerge. In wind, global competitiveness is under pressure. In hydrogen and batteries, the main problem remains demand. In critical raw materials, objectives are conditioned by costs.
The result is a coherent industrial strategy but one still exposed to economic variables that condition its real effectiveness.